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Abstract 
This study examined the link between organizational performance and 
CEO’S compensation of firms listed at the NSE.  Past studies on the 
determinants of CEO’S compensation revealed a lack of consensus to the 
explanation of increases in CEO’S compensation.  While most of the studies 
confirm linkages between organizational performance and CEO’S 
compensation, they measured organizational performance using financial 
indicators of performance, the current study investigates the relationship 
between organizational performance and CEO’S compensation but differs 
from the previous studies by expanding the measures of organizational 
performance to include the balanced scorecard measures of performance.  The 
theoretical foundations of this study were based on agency theory.    The 
study’s population constituted 60 firms listed at the NSE.  Descriptive 
crossectional survey was adopted for this study.  Both Primary and Secondary 
data were used to gather information required for the study.  Descriptive 
statistics and regression were used to analyze and interpret the collected data.  
The study revealed that there was significant and positive relationship between 
organizational performance and CEO’S compensation.  The findings of this 
study are of benefit to board members of organizations in identifying the 
performance measures that are important to consider when making decisions 
on CEO’S compensation. 
Keywords: NSE, CEO’s, Security Exchange 
 
Introduction 
As today’s business environment become increasingly complex and 
global, they are faced with the challenges of managing continuous change, 
competition, cost constraints, increasing employee demands, legal 
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requirements among others.  Human Resource Management is seen as a major 
contributor in helping the organizations deal with these challenges by 
designing ways to effectively increase employee’s productivity and 
commitment.  To this end, one area of concern to human resource managers is 
the implementation of employee compensation programs that would satisfy 
employees’ needs as well as contain the costs of labor for the firms (Bernardin, 
J. 2007).  In trying to achieve this, firms have continuously seen the need to 
tie employees’ levels of pay especially the executives to the levels of 
individual and organizational performance. As such decisions on designing 
the CEO’S compensation are crucial to an organization since they are 
responsible for the overall performance of the organization.  One of the 
concerns in compensation management today is the variation in Chief 
Executive Officer’s compensation.  Literature indicates that CEO’S 
compensation levels vary from firm to firm and from industry to industry but 
there is no explanation for these variations.  This study seeks to find out 
explanations to these variations by re-examining the influence of 
organizational performance, CEO’S power and firm size in the determination 
of CEO’S compensation levels.  
According to Sonenshine et al, (2016) the debate on CEO’S 
compensation is largely centered on two view points.  That is, whether the 
CEO’S earn their compensation through organizational performance and 
productivity or whether the CEO’S simply capture their compensation through 
extraction of rent due to weak board or poor governance.  The first view 
proposing that CEO’S compensation ought to be associated to observable 
organizational performance measures like stock prices and earning so as to 
motivate the CEO’S to enhance organizational performance.  On the other 
hand, the second view argues that CEO’S compensation is affected by the 
availability of rents and the bargaining power that the CEO’S have over the 
board of directors and shareholders.  Equally, empirical studies have been able 
to establish that organizational size also influences CEO’S compensation and 
that larger organizations generally offer higher compensation to their CEO’S. 
Organizational performance can be characterized as the firm’s ability 
to create acceptable outcomes and actions (Reed et al, 2000).  It comprises the 
actual output or results of an organization as measured against its intended 
outputs, goals or objectives.  Upadhaya B. et al, (2014) propose that in recent 
years, many organizations have attempted to manage organizational 
performance using the balanced scorecard methodology where performance is 
tracked and measured in multiple dimensions such as financial performance, 
customer service, social responsibility and employee stewardship.   
Organizational performance from the stakeholder’s perspective can be viewed 
as having met the expectations of a variety of stakeholder groups like 
employees, customers, suppliers, governments, local communities that have 
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particular interest in the effects of the organization’s activities.  Organizational 
performance has been strongly associated to CEO’S performance (Epstein & 
Roy 2005, Jensen and Murphy 1990, Wade Porac & Pollock 1997 and 
Baptista, 2010).  Another factor that could explain the variations in CEO’S 
compensation is the power of the CEO to influence their own pay.  CEO’S are 
considered to be the most powerful corporate actors although some are more 
powerful than others.   The power of the CEO to influence the board’s 
decisions and shape the strategy of the organization is one of the salient issues 
in corporate governance (Malekzadeh, 2002).  This influence over the board 
by the CEO may extend the decisions on their pay structure.  Firms vary in 
characteristics in terms of size, age, reputation, nature of business and 
ownership structures.  These variations may explain the differences in their 
performance level and as such the CEO’S compensation.  This study 
considered firm size, ownership structure thus whether public or private firm 
and industry type/ sector in describing firm size. 
This study focused on the firms listed at the NSE as its context.  The 
NSE consists of firms that can be categorized as public owned of private 
owned firms.  The NSE consists of 65 firms in various industry sectors that 
can be categorized into 8 sectors namely agriculture, automobiles and 
accessories, banking, commercial and services, construction and allied 
insurance, investment and manufacturing and allied. This provides an 
environment that allows for comparisons of CEO’S compensation among the 
various firms with reference to their performance, characteristics and CEO’S 
power.  It was expected that listed companies comply with the NSE and CMA 
regulations for them to continue selling at the browse.  The Nairobi Securities 
Exchange has in place very strict and  elaborate listing regime at the bourse, 
including disclosures, reporting obligations, financial requirements, records to 
be maintained, code of conduct, self regulations, submission of annual budget, 
and other corporate governance requirements.  The listing requirements, 
though strict and at times viewed as inhibitive, are necessary to ensure that 
only the best managed companies find their way to the Nairobi Security 
Exchange. These requirements for the firms to be listed at the NSE provides a 
good ground to conduct the study and CEO’s compensation due to easy access 
to relevant data on organizational performance. 
The next section provides definitions of the key study variables. 
 
Organizational Performance 
The definition of organizational performance as proposed by several 
writers is based upon the idea that an organization is a voluntary association 
of productive assets, including human, physical and capital resources, for the 
purposes of achieving a shared purposes or goal (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972.  
Barney, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Simon, 1976). There are two main 
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ways in which we can think of the theory of the firm and each has different 
implications for reporting organizational performance.  These are the 
shareholder theory and stakeholder theory (Owen, 2006, Brown and Fraser, 
2006).  In the 1980’s the firm was viewed as belonging to shareholders and so 
the shareholder theory, which uses shareholder return to measure overall firm 
performance dominated organizational performance measurement system, 
(Porter, 1980).  However since the early 1990’s a more stakeholder based view 
gradually began to prevail.  This perspective views the firm as having 
responsibilities to a wider set of groups than simply shareholders.  Other 
stakeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, governments, industry 
bodies, local communities and so forth (Reich, 1998, Post et.al, 2002, Brown 
and Fraser, 2006).  It assesses organizational performance against the 
expectations of a variety of stakeholder groups that have particular interests in 
the effects of the organization’s activities. 
Wade et. al. (1997) propose that the performance of public held 
companies can be broken down in three components namely; accounting 
returns and profitability, stock market returns and ‘beta’ which measures the 
volatility of a company’s stock price relative to broad market indicators.  They 
further argue that high accounting returns like return on equity, imply that 
management has been successful in balancing revenues and costs and making 
good use of organizational assets to create value.  Market returns represent the 
collective opinion of investors on the organizational abilities to generate 
wealth.  Such that higher shareholder returns legitimize management. Epstein 
and Roy (2005) argue that in the past years, researchers have suggested a 
number of management systems to hasten the development of critical 
measures that can guide long term corporate decision (Eccles, 1991; Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 2000).  These managerial systems mainly 
rely on the identification of organizational strategic objectives, the key 
performance, indicators and drivers and a wider set of both financial and non-
financial measures of performance.  Growing importance has been given by 
academicians and consultants to the balanced scorecard approach as a useful 
tool for the development. 
One dominant approach which has been universally accepted to 
measure organizational performance is the Balance Scorecard (BSC) system 
by Kaplan and Norton (1992) which is based on the stakeholder theory.  The 
BSC incorporates financial, customer/market, short-term efficiency and long-
term learning and development factors.  Mooraj et.al, (1999) argues that 
although the BSC’s are common, they are primarily a tool for measuring 
external and internal economic value.  This study therefore adopts the BSC 
approach of organizational performance measurement.  
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CEO’S Compensation 
Bernardin (2007) defines compensation as all forms of financial 
returns and tangible benefits that employees receive as part of an employment 
relationship.  Executive pay is financial compensation received by senior 
managers of a firm. It is typically a mixture of salary, bonuses, shares and or 
call options on the company stock, benefits and perquisites, ideally configured 
to take into account government regulations, tax law, the desires of an 
organization and the executive, and performance (Elling 2002).   The mixing 
of the different components of pay into a complex compensation package for 
executives allows the shortcoming of one component to be offset by the 
strength of another.  Cash bonuses focus executives on the immediate success 
of the firm by paying them for reaching short-term goals.  This counters the 
shortcoming of restricted stock that base awards on the long run outcomes and 
does not pay rewards for short-term production.  To reduce the problem of the 
company stock price moving based on market forces and not that of the 
executive’s movement of a market index of stocks (Sigler, 2011).  Over the 
past three decades, executive pay has risen dramatically relative to that of an 
average worker’s wage in the United States, The Guardian, 2005, and to a 
lesser extent in some other countries. Observers differ as to whether this rise 
is a natural and beneficial result of competition for scarce business talent that 
can add greatly to stakeholder value in large companies or a social harmful 
phenomenon brought about by social and political changes that have given 
executives greater control over their own pay, (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). 
Executive pay is an important part of corporate governance and is often 
determined by a company’s board of directors. 
A major challenge that scholars encounter in trying to understand the 
factors that determine CEO’S compensation is the various components that 
constitute the total remuneration of CEO’S compensation package.  Besides 
the terms used by researchers, industry and countries are not consistent and 
tend to cause confusion.  A case to mention is that performance share plan is 
a commonly used term in the United Kingdom as opposed to long term 
incentive plan (LTIP) in the US which refers to the same type of plan.  
Adopting Farmer (2008) definitions; a basic pay could be provided to CEO’S 
on a monthly basis and is a constant amount with no risk of non-payment.  The 
CEO’S are also offered a bonus which is at risk of non-payment since it is 
dependent of organizational performance.  This highest bonus is paid when 
performance goes beyond the upper threshold yet no bonus will be paid for 
performance below a lower threshold. 
CEO’S are eligible to receive grants of share options within the rules 
of long term incentive plans.  The value of the share option will move in the 
same direction with the company share price hence they are also at a risk of 
decreasing in value just like the bonus.  Most CEO’S are also entitled to 
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benefits such as club membership, driver, housing allowance, security, 
education, holidays, medical covers among others.  Most organizations also 
provide the CEO’S with a retirement plan.  Going by disclosures ont eh annual 
reports of firms listed at the NSE, CEO’S compensation largely consists of 
salaries, allowances, cash bonuses and fees for services as directors (Aduda, 
2011).  Sigler (2011) writing on the components of CEO’S compensation for 
American firms, noted that the first component of CEO’S compensation is 
base salary which comprises 11.2% of their compensation.  Going by the study 
by Economic Research Institute in 2010, CEO’S base salaries are determined 
by the opinion of compensation committee who largely consist of the members 
of the board of directors.   
Secondly, CEO’S compensation include incentive plans consisting of 
cash bonuses which are paid in lumpsum at the end of the financial year as a 
way of motivating performance of the CEO. Bonuses act as incentives which 
are paid to the CEO’S upon attaining previously set goals.  Bonuses are linked 
to accounting measures and are highly associated to the CEO’S specific areas 
of responsibility.  They are aimed at motivating the CEO to pay more attention 
on the company’s key objectives of increasing shareholder value and in turn 
their own wealth.  Bonuses may be provided in association to the achievement 
of short-term, intermediate term, or even long term goals of an organization.  
A third component of CEO’S compensation could be seen as executive stock 
options which also act as an incentive to the CEO’S.  The stock options could 
be provided in various forms including qualified incentive stock options and 
non qualified stock options which are used by many organizations as forms of 
equity compensation for CEO’S to drive them towards working in the best 
interest of shareholders.  The qualified stock options provide a tax benefit but 
they equally have complicated tax consequences.  Non qualified stock options 
have a draw back to the CEO’S since taxable income is usually reported at the 
time when the non-qualified options are exercised without the consideration 
of whether the stocks have been sold or not.  Qualified stock options mitigate 
this disadvantage since they do not report any income at the time they are 
exercised unless the stock is sold.  Executive stock options tend to reduce 
greater risk aversion by providing the CEO’S an incentive to increase 
organizational risk by allowing risky but profitable projects as opposed to 
avoiding them.   
A fourth form of CEO’S compensation is the restricted stock 
ownership of an organization which merges the interest of shareholders and 
the CEO’S.  Restricted stock limits the shares that a CEO can own.  A common 
restriction is the imposition of the time period that has to elapse or for the 
achievement of particular goals before the CEO can cash in the stock.  A fifth 
compensation component for CEO’S is a golden parachute that consists of 
lucrative benefits that CEO’S are offered in the event that the organization is 
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taken over by another firm causing the CEO to lose their job.  Specifically, the 
golden parachute items include: stock options, severance pay and bonuses.  
The sixth and last component of CEO’S compensation constitutes benefits that 
go to the CEO and includes retirement plans, life insurance, medical cover, 
car allowances, club membership, travel re-imbursements, paid holidays and 
vacations.  The table below provides a summary of the key components of 
CEO’S compensation and their alternative names. 
 
Literature Review 
According to Ozkan (2011), the compensation package of CEO’S has 
been viewed as an important factor in resolving the conflict of interest between 
executives and shareholders of organizations.  Organizations today have come 
to the recognition that CEO’S compensation could be a useful tool in 
motivating CEO’S to act in the best interest of the organizations.  The rapid 
increase in CEO’s compensations has provoked renewed interest in 
understanding the factors that determine CEO’s compensation. At the centre 
of the debate are arguments concerning whether the compensation increases 
are earned by the CEO’s due to good performance and productivity or whether 
it is the CEO who have power to drive their pay upwards by extracting rents 
from a weak board (Sonenshine et al, 2016). 
 
Organizational Performance and CEO’S Compensation 
Firm performance is argued to be the major determinant of CEO 
compensation and that on the basis of literature; firms should compensate their 
CEO’S depending on how much they bring to the firm.  Previous studies by 
Buigut, et al, (2014); Chalmer & colleagues, (2006); Kubo, (2001); 
Fenkelstein, Hambrick, (1989), indicate that firm performance is positively 
related to CEO’S compensation. Ozkan (2007) suggests that in the UK, 
organizational performance has a positive relationship with CEO’s 
compensation and this applies more with the cash forms of compensation. 
While other studies like, Tarus, et al, (2014); Flrming & Stellios, (2002); Izan 
et al, (1998); Jensent & Murphy, (1990), show a weak or negative relationship 
between firm performance and CEO’S pay.  A number of firm specific 
characteristics like size can be thought of as influencing executive 
compensations. Brick et al, (2005) found a strong but negative relationship 
between organizational performance and CEO’s compensation. Shah and 
Javed, (2009) observed that organizational performance is considered to be 
perhaps the most significant determining factor of CEO’S compensation.  
Historically, literature on CEO’S compensation provides an emphasis that 
CEO’S compensation should be linked to organizational performance.  Some 
academic studies suggest CEO’S compensation to be better predicted by 
profit.  According to Fenkenlstein & Hambrick, (1989) and Deckop (1988), 
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organizational profitability is strongly related to CEO’S compensation while 
return on equity is unrelated to CEO’S salary but positively associated to 
bonuses that CEO’S receive.  However, some studies record contradicting 
results on the relationship between organizational performance and CEO’S 
compensation.  There is a weak relationship between CEO’S compensation 
and stockholders wealth (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Fleming & Stellions, 
(2002) also found no relationship between organizational performance and 
CEO’S compensation.  Chalmers & Colleagues (2006) revealed that return on 
asset was strongly related to all components of CEO’S compensation and that 
CEO’S bonuses are related to annual stock market returns. 
Farmer (2008) argues that literature on CEO’S compensation has 
considerably increased over the last 60 years and covers an array of disciplines 
including accounting, economics, law and organizational strategy.  
Accountants like Healy (1985) in his studies considered the link between 
accounting based compensation incentives and manipulation of earnings.  
Baimen and Verrechchia (1995) also accountant, explored the relative 
effectiveness of accounting-based compensation and market-based 
performance measures.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) who were financial 
economists, focused their studies on the relationship between CEO’S 
compensation and organizational performance.  They also studied the 
influence investment decision, capital structure, dividend policies mergers and 
diversification on CEO’S compensation.  According to Wade et.al; (1997) the 
amount of compensation a CEO receives is on one-half of the current debate 
on pay-for-performance.  The other half is about the actual performance or 
organizations.  Poor organizational performance sparks scrutiny of investors 
who are seeking to place the blame of poor performance on management.  On 
the other hand when organizations report high performance justification for 
higher CEO compensation is eased by relaxing legitimacy threats. 
The principal-agent problem has partially resolved using CEO’S 
compensation so as to align the CEO’S interest with the interest of sharehlders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Holmstrom (1982) argue that in principle, the 
compensation of CEO’S should be pegged on the most informative indicators 
in terms of whether the CEO has taken action that maximize shareholder’s 
value.  Since in reality the shareholders are not likely to understand or know 
the particular actions that maximize value, the incentive forms of 
compensation offered to CEO’S should be those that help the principals 
achieve their ultimate objective of shareholder value maximization.  Through 
the effective designing and provision of ownership stake to a firm, 
compensation offered to CEO’S that are linked to equity, creates a motivating 
force for the CEO’S to take actions that benefit shareholders.  Optimal contract 
helps balance the provision of incentives to CEO’S against exposing risk 
averse CEO’S to much volatility in their compensation. 
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Previous literature generally shows a strong relationship between 
organizational performance and CEO’S compensation where firm 
performance is measured by return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
(Finkelstein Hambrick, 1989 and Kobo, 2001).  They argue that the 
profitability of firms is a better determination of CEO’S compensation. 
According to Guest (2009) there is a positive relationship between board size 
and CEO’s compensation. Board members are an important source on internal 
control mechanism in setting CEO’s compensation. They also have the 
responsibility in deciding the succession of the CEO and future projects of the 
organization (Rahaja, 2005). Core et al, (1999) argue that CEO’s 
compensation is influenced by a number of factors including firm 
performance, firm size, complexity of firm, growth opportunities and board 
structure. Concerning the pay-performance relation, there is wide evidence for 
a strong relation in the US. Jensen and Murphy (1990) found a positive and 
significant relation between cash compensation and firm performance 
measured by shareholder wealth.   In addition, Joskow and Rose (1994) 
suggest a robust relation firm performance measured by both market-based 
and accounting measure and total compensation. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) observed that it is important to align 
organizational performance with CEO’S compensation.  They demonstrated 
that a CEO with less than sole ownership of the organization usually is 
motivated to take actions that may decrease organizational value.  When 
designing CEO’S compensation structure, organizations will provide long-
term executive stock options in an attempt to motivate the CEO to act as an 
owner would do.  Leonard (1990) asserts that when CEO’S are offered long 
term incentive plans, there will be an increase in organizations return on equity 
as opposed to those firms that do not offer long-term incentive plans.  Jensen 
and Murphy (2010) also proposed that the compensation of CEO’S in most 
public companies is highly associated with organizational performance. 
Rose and Joskow, (1994) found that past performance influences not 
only cash compensation, but also total compensation.  In line with Jensen and 
Murphy, they found that the lagged performance effect decays considerably 
over two to three years.  They used not only market-based measures of 
performance, but also accounting measures.  For stock return, they find that 1-
year lagged return has at the least the same impact on current compensation 
than current return, but that further lags have a small effect on compensation.   
For accounting returns, they find that the returns effect compensation decays 
almost proportionally over time. Other studies show no relationship between 
organization performance and CEO’S compensation (Fleming & Stellio, 2002, 
Izan et al, 1998, Defina et.al., 1994).  Tosi & Collegues (2002) also found a 
week relationship between CEO’S compensation and firm performance.  
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Chalmers & Colleagues (2006) show that ROA is positively associated with 
all compensation components except shares.  
Aduda, (2011) conducted a study on the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm performance on commercial banks listed at 
Nairobi Securities Exchange and the results indicated that accounting 
measures of performance are not key considerations in determining executive 
compensation among the banks in Kenya and that instead size is a key criterion 
in determining executive compensation.  These two studies only focused on 
the directly compensation in specific industries.  The current study expands 
performance measures to include operational and market based measures 
among all the firms listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange which has a 
representation of companies in various industries.  Wade, Porac, and Pollock, 
(1997), conducted a study on how the compensation committees of a sample 
of U.S corporations from the S and P 500 justify their compensation practices 
to shareholders. They found that when companies have more concentrated and 
active outside owners, they are much more likely to justify their compensation 
practices by citing the role of compensation consultants as advisors in the 
compensation-setting process.  They are also more likely to discuss the 
alignment of managerial and shareholder interests and to downplay a 
company’s accounting returns.  Companies that pay their CEO’S large base 
salaries are also more likely to cite the role of consultants and for those with 
dispersed ownership, to discuss shareholder alignment.  High accounting 
returns lead companies to emphasize accounting performance in their 
compensation justification and to downplay market returns.  Another study by 
Epstein and Roy, (2005) on evaluating and monitoring CEO’S performance 
found that although there are a growing number of companies using non-
financial metrics to evaluate CEO’S performance, their results confirmed that 
CEO’S are primarily evaluated on financial criteria, indicating a narrow 
definition of corporate performance. In the current study organizational 
performance is considered as a reflection of CEO’S performance and is 
measured in terms of SBSC measures. 
Most of studies on executive compensation have been carried out in 
the context of American and European organization.  Khana and Palepu, 
(1997), have pointed out that the significant differences in the institutional 
context in which firms in emerging markets like Kenya operate.  In Kenya the 
effect of economic liberisation along with a wide range of changes in the 
market for managerial talent has resulted in significant changes in the 
compensation policies adopted by firms.  The studies reviewed above show 
that there are relationships between organizational performance, CEO’S 
power, firm size and CEO’S compensation.  A majority of the studies focused 
on the relation organizational performance as the key determinant of CEO’S 
compensation with most of them finding positive relationships and a few 
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others revealing weak or even negative associations.  Besides the studies 
measured firm performance largely by accounting indices. 
The current study starts by arguing that indeed organizational 
performance determines CEO’S compensation but expands the performance 
measures in line with the sustainable balanced scorecard.    Besides very few 
of the previous studies consider the combined effect of the determinant of the 
CEO’S compensation.  The current study seeks to establish the effect of 
organizational performance on CEO’S compensation as its key objective. 
 
Theoretical underpinning  
To shed new light on the ongoing controversy on CEO compensation, 
the study was grounded on agency theory. According to Abed et al. (2004) it 
is through organizational practices and theoretical arguments that discussions 
on determinants of CEO remuneration are far from ending.  However, 
although various theoretical positions proposed to elucidate remuneration, this 
are of study is still largely dominated by the “agency theory”.  Key concern of 
“agency theory” has to do with associations that are likened to the nature of 
relationships that exist between an agent and a principle who contracts them 
to work for them.  However, it is expected that between the agent and the 
principal their needs will defer (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The theory seeks to 
provide solutions to the conflicts that may emerge in an agency relationship.  
The initial conflict that may arise is a situation where the needs of the principal 
and the agent do not merge and another problem is the difficulty that the 
principal is likely to face in trying to follow up what the contracted individual 
is up to. Thus the principal is unable to check if the agent has acted in an 
acceptable manner. 
Agency theory proposes that:  
The owners of a firm delegate authority to make strategic decisions on 
their behalf to an agent: the CEO. Agency theory highlights the 
existence of an agency problem:  a CEO and the firm’s shareholders 
often have differing interest such that the CEO   may make moves that 
are in her best interests even if they hurt the firm (Jensen & Mackling 
1976).   
 
The shareholders’ main watchdog is the board, whose job includes 
monitoring the CEO and managing the CEO’S compensation package.  
Ideally, the board will craft a compensation package that aligns the CEO’S 
goals with those of the shareholders (Elsenhardt, 1989).  Many boards for 
example emphasize stock options and other forms of contingent 
compensation.  By drawing a connection between the CEO’S pay and firm 
performance, the board strives to motivate the CEO to pursue courses of action 
that maximize shareholder returns.  In crafting a compensation package, the 
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board should consider not only the overall value but also the mix of the pay 
elements in the compensation package.  Rather than determining how much to 
pay executives, the central legitimizing issue in the agency approach is how to 
pay them (Barkema, Geroski, and Schwalbach, 1997; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990).  Pay is seen as a consequence of agency problems, the question how to 
pay the executive is the main issue addressed in these theories. Agency 
problems exist in any situation where one party entrusts responsibility of tasks 
to another party”.  
The agency problem could partially be resolved using executive 
compensation by matching the needs of a manager to needs of owners (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  Organizations hope that by offering CEO’S the chance 
to partially own their firms through equity-linked compensation, the CEO’S 
would be steered to act for the benefit of owners. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual model of this study considered how Organizational 
performance affect the determination of CEO’S compensation. It showed that 
organizational performance is the main factor that firms considers in making 
CEO’S compensation decision.  Organizational performance is measured on 
the basis of balanced score card elements including financial measures, 
customer satisfaction, internal processes success, learning and growth 
strategies. This is tested with hypothesis studies hypothesis which states that; 
Organizational performance has influence on CEO’S compensation. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework   
  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
The study adopted the positivist approach as the basis for the 
methodology and procedures used in this study.  This approach allowed use of 
quantitative data to test the research hypothesis drawn from the theoretical 
framework. 
Descriptive cross-sectional design was adopted for the study. Cross-
sectional studies are carried out once and represent snapshot at one point in 
time (Cooper and Schindler, 2008).  A descriptive cross-sectional design 
enabled the researcher to establish any relationships between and among 
organizational performance, and CEO’S compensation of firms listed in NSE. 
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Financial data was collected for the period 2016/2017.  The design was chosen 
considering the type of data and the analysis that is carried out.   
The relevant population for the study comprised all companies listed 
at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE).  According to the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange Handbook 2016, the total number of listed companies at the browse 
was 60.  This study was therefore a census survey of all listed companies. Data 
on financial performance was obtained from financial reports filed with capital 
markets authority (CMA).Data on firm size was also collected from the 
source. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The study used primary and secondary data to test the hypotheses. The 
primary data on organizational performance and CEO’S compensation 
collected using a structured questionnaire.  The questionnaire was researcher-
administered to the firms’ directors with assistance from the company 
secretaries who are also the secretaries to the board. The questionnaire 
gathered data on the Organizational performance and CEO’S compensation.  
The questionnaire was on Likert-type statements anchored on five-point rating 
scale ranging from none (1) to very high (5).  This approach was also applied 
in related studies like Kidombo (2007), Ongore (2008) and Chang (2010). 
Secondary data on organizational performance (return on assets) was extracted 
from organizational financial reports. 
Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics in order to describe the 
main characteristics of the variables of interest in the study. Pearson’s Product 
Moment Correlation (r) analysis was used to assess the strength and direction 
of the relationships between study variables.  Coefficient of determination (R2) 
was used to measure the amount of variation in the CEO’S compensation due 
to the predictor variables.   
 
Research Findings And Discussion 
Questionnaires were administered to all the 60 firms.  However, 
responses were only obtained from only 40 firms.  This represents a 66.67 
percent response rate which is considered representative and satisfactory to 
draw conclusions for the study.  Although the intention was to randomly 
collect data from four directors in each firm, in reality, this was not possible.  
However, due to the sensitive nature of this study, and based on the promise 
of confidentiality, the names of the companies from which data was collected 
are not disclosed. 
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Research Findings 
CEO’S compensation  
The study sought to investigate the percentage adjustment of the 
CEO’S pay between 2015 and 2016.  Findings revealed a positive adjustment 
on the CEO’S pay with an average of 3.325 thus implying to 6-10% increment 
in CEO’S compensation. 
 
Organizational Performance (OP) 
Organizational performance was the study’s independent variable.  To 
determine the relationship between organizational performance and the other 
study variables, it was important to seek the Respondent’s opinion on the 
extent to which they would consider it in determining the CEO’S performance 
and as such the level of compensation offered to the CEO.  Organizational 
performance was measured using a 5 point Likert scale where the rating of 1 
indicated very large extent to 5 representing not at all.  Therefore a score of 
≤1.5 was interpreted to mean considered to a very large extent, while scores 
of 1.5 to ≤2.5 indicated that the respondents considered the item to a large 
extent and 2.5 to ≤3.5 was interpreted to mean that the respondents moderately 
considered the item.  As for the mean scores a mean of 3.5 to ≤4.5 was 
interpreted to mean that the respondent considered the variable to a less extent, 
while a mean score of ≥4.5 was interpreted to mean the variable was not 
considered at all.  In terms of the standard deviation, a value of ≤1 was 
interpreted to mean that the Respondents agreed in the rating of the statement 
while a value of >1 was interpreted to mean Respondents differed in their 
opinion about the statement.  18 items were used to measure organizational 
performance in the listed firms.  These items were adopted from the balanced 
score card as used by Kaplan and Norton (1996) that measures organizational 
performance in 4 dimensions of financial indicators, management of customer 
relations and growth, internal processes and learning and growth.  The 
Respondent’s opinion relating to the variable under each of the 4 dimensions 
of organizational performance is presented in the following sub-sections. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 
This study’s hypothesis was stated as; CEO’S Compensation is influenced by 
Organizational Performance. 
Simple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis.  In 
order to be able to apply parametric statistics such as multiple regression and 
correlation, it is paramount that the sample data be normally distributed and 
homogenies in nature.  Since the study used linear regression to test the study 
hypothesis, preliminary tests were done to confirm normality and linearity to 
ensure it meets the requirements.  Initial analysis on the data was done to 
assess if it fits normal distribution requirements.  Data normality was 
European Scientific Journal July 2020 edition Vol.16, No.19 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
512 
determined using Skewness and Kurtosis values, where skewness is a measure 
of distributions deviation from symmetry while Kurtosis is a measure of a 
distribution’s peakedness (Cooper and Schindler, 2014).  Skewness value of 
zero shows perfect normal distribution.  As shown in table 2, CEO’S 
compensation and organizational performance, did not extremely deviate from 
normal distribution assumptions and as such meeting the requirements to run 
regression analysis. 
Table 2:  Results of tests of normality 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
CEO’S compensation -1.484 1.445 
Organizational performance 0.384 -0.398 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Linear regression analysis requires that data must be linear and as such there 
should be no multicollinearity or autocorrelation.  A scatterplot was used to 
test for linearity and indicated that the variables were related in a linear 
fashion. 
Table 3: Results of Inter-variable Correlation analysis 
 CC OP   
CC 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 40    
OP 
 
 
 
Pearson Correlation .490** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .001    
N 40 40   
     
The correlation matrix in Table 3 was derived from inter-item correlation 
analysis. The result for testing multicollinearity was less than 1 hence 
indicating that there was no multicollinearity. 
Table 4:  Regression Results for the Influence of Organizational Performance on CEO’S 
Compensation 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .490 .240 .220 .83395 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 8.347 1 8.347 12.002 .001b 
Residual 26.428 38 .695   
Total 34.775 39    
COEFFICIENTS 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.349 .585  2.305 .027 
OP .870 .251 .490 3.464 .001 
 
Predictors: (Constant), Organizational Performance 
Dependent Variable: CEO’S Compensation  
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The results in Table 4 indicate a model fit (F=12.002, P<0.05).  The 
findings further reveal a significant effect of organizational performance on 
CEO’S compensation (R2=.24, F=12.002, P<0.05).  This means that 24% of 
the variation in CEO’S compensation was explained by variation in 
organizational performance.  The table further reveals that beta coefficient was 
significant (β=0.87, t=2.305, P<0.05).  This suggests that CEO’S 
compensation changes by 87% for every unit change in organizational 
performance.  Hypothesis one was thus supported.  
The overall regression model can be stated as CC=1.349+0.87OP+ε.   
 
Discussion of the findings 
This section provides discussion of the results under each research 
objective and conceptual hypothesis. The findings of the study are discussed 
in comparison with the results of previous studies that are related to the study 
variables to reveal any consistencies or inconsistencies. The results are also 
discussed in relation to theories that underpin them. 
The objective of the study was to establish the influence of 
organizational performance on CEO’s compensation for firms listed at the 
NSE. Hypothesis one was confirmed by the results of the simple linear 
regression analysis (R2 = 0.24, F = 12.002 and P < 0.05). Further, the results 
revealed that the rate of change between the two variables was significant (β 
= 0.87, t = 2.305 and P < 0.05). These results are in line with previous studies 
that show a strong relationship between organizational performance and 
CEO’s compensation, where firm performance was measured by return on 
asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).  Jensen and Murphy (1990) found a 
positive and significant relationship between CEO’S cash components of and 
organizational performance measured by shareholder wealth.   In addition, 
Joskow and Rose (1994) suggested a robust relationship between 
organizational performance measured by both market-based and accounting 
measures and CEO’S total compensation. 
However, the current study expanded the measures of organizational 
performance to include the balanced scorecard elements of financial 
indicators, customer satisfaction, internal processes and learning and 
development. The results of the regression analysis on the balance scorecard 
measure revealed their significant relationships with CEO’s compensation (R2 
= 0.137, 0.067, 0.171 and 0.399). This implied that learning and development 
explained 39.9% of variations in CEO’s compensation, internal processes 
explained 17.1% of the variations, financial indicators explained 13.7% of the 
variation while customer satisfaction explained 6.7% of the variations in 
CEO’s compensation.  
These results affirm the preposition of Kaplan and Norton (1992) who 
argued that organizational performance should not be viewed narrowly by 
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focusing on the financial results but rather organizational performance 
measurement should as a whole consider the factors of drive and contribute to 
firm’s performance like learning and development, internal processes and 
customer satisfaction. The results of the study revealed that firms listed at the 
NSE consider both the financial and non-financial indicators of organizational 
performance when making decisions on the level of CEO’S compensation. 
These findings are also in line with Esptein and Roy (2005) argument 
indicating that a growing number of companies now use non-financial metrics 
to evaluate CEO’s performance.  
The results of this study however contradict Tarus (2014) and Aduda 
(2011), which on executive compensation found no significant relationship 
between executive compensation and financial performance of firms. This 
could be explained by the fact that the two studies, while done in the Kenyan 
context, focused on the overall executive compensation and not the individual 
CEO. Besides, the studies were conducted for specific industries, namely 
insurance and banking while the current study included all the firms listed out 
at the NSE. The results of the study indicate that organization boards consider 
organizational performance in determining the level of compensation to offer 
the CEO’s. This is explained by the theoretical propositions of the Agency 
theory that propose that owners of a firm delegate authorities to make 
decisions on their behalf to an agent, the CEO. The theory highlights the 
existence of an agency problem where a CEO and the firm’s shareholders 
often have differing interest such that the CEO may make moves that are in 
her best interest even if they hurt the firm (Jensen and Mackling, 1976). As 
such, in deciding the level of CEO’s compensation. Boards consider the 
organization’s performance so as to influence the CEO’s behavior and interest 
towards enhancing organizational performance. 
 
Conclusion and implications 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of firm size 
and CEO’S power on the relationship between organizational performance 
and CEO’S compensation for firms listed at the NSE.  The objective of this 
study was to establish the influence of organizational performance on the 
determination of CEO’S compensation for firms listed at the NSE.   
The study revealed that the listed firms provided their CEO’S with a 
basic pay, benefits and perquisites including medical cover, pension, club 
membership, vehicle with driver and fuel, education fund for the family and 
security by body guard.  However, the benefits package varied from one firm 
to another.  Long term incentives were also offered in form of stock ownership 
but at minimal levels.  Bonuses were provided to CEO’S largely based on firm 
performance and constituted a large portion of the CEO’S annual total 
remuneration.  In respect to the studies’ objective that sought to investigate 
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the influence of organizational performance on CEO’S compensation, the 
results indicated that there was a positive and significant relationship between 
the organizational performance and CEO’S compensation.  Organizational 
performance was measured using 4 sub-variables in line with balance score 
card that is; financial indicators, internal processes, customer satisfaction and 
learning and growth.  A correlation analysis indicated a moderately positive 
and statistically significant relationship between financial indicators of 
performance and internal processes with CEO’S compensation.  There was a 
positive but weak relationship between customer satisfaction and CEO’S 
compensation though the relationship was insignificant.  The relationship 
between CEO’S compensation and learning and growth was positive and 
statistically significant.  Of the four variables, learning and growth  explained 
variations in CEO’S compensation to a higher degree, followed by internal 
processes, financial indicators and the lowest being customer satisfaction.  
Multiple regression for the effect of organization performance on CEO’S 
compensation indicated that organizational performance explains 24% of 
variations in CEO’S compensation.  Financial indicators, internal processes 
and learning and growth reveal significant relationships with CEO’S 
compensation but insignificant relationship with customer satisfaction. 
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